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Rhetorical Analysis

The Rhetoric of War | Artivist.Media
Artivist.Media
The Machine We’re Inside · Issue 05
March 21, 2026
Rhetorical Analysis

The Rhetoric of War:
Unpacking the Claims That Built a Bombing Campaign

Two phrases — “Iran supports terrorism throughout the region” and “Iran spends on missiles instead of its people” — have anchored decades of U.S. policy toward Iran. What do the numbers actually say?


Three weeks into Operation Epic Fury — a joint U.S.-Israeli military assault on Iran that Congress never authorized — the Pentagon is requesting an additional $200 billion in war funding. At the March 19 press briefing where Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth announced this figure, he also accused Iran of spending on weapons instead of caring for its people. Days earlier, administration officials again invoked the claim that Iran is the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism.

These two claims — “Iran supports terrorism throughout the region” and “Iran prioritizes military spending over its people” — are not analytical conclusions. They are rhetorical technologies. They are designed to foreclose inquiry, to make a bombing campaign feel self-evident, and to render invisible the actual data about who spends what, on whom, and why.

Let’s open them up.

“Iran Supports Terrorism Throughout the Region”

This sentence has appeared in every State of the Union, National Security Strategy, and Pentagon press briefing for over two decades. It has the quality of a settled fact — a phrase so often repeated that it no longer invites scrutiny. That is precisely its function.

What Is Factually Grounded

Iran does fund, arm, and provide strategic guidance to non-state armed groups across the Middle East through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its elite Quds Force. Consensus estimates place Iran’s annual proxy support at between $1–2 billion, with Hezbollah as the largest recipient at approximately $700 million to $1 billion per year. The U.S. State Department estimated that Iran directed more than $16 billion toward the Assad regime and allied armed groups between 2012 and 2020. Smaller but significant streams flow to Hamas ($80–350 million/year, varying by period), Palestinian Islamic Jihad (~$70 million/year), the Houthis ($300–500 million/year), and Iraqi militia factions ($1–2 billion/year).

$1–2B
Iran’s est. annual proxy spending
$16B+
Iran proxy spending 2012–2020 (State Dept. est.)
$700M–1B
Annual transfers to Hezbollah

What the Framing Obscures

The word “terrorism” does enormous analytical work. The groups Iran supports — Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, Iraqi PMF factions — are designated as terrorist organizations by the U.S. and some allies. But several simultaneously function as political parties, social service providers, or formally integrated components of sovereign state militaries. The Iraqi PMF is officially part of Iraq’s security forces. Hezbollah holds seats in Lebanese parliament and operates hospitals and schools. Hamas won a legislative election. The designation “terrorism” flattens this complexity into a single moral category that makes the proxy network seem irrational rather than strategic. The degree of Iranian control varies enormously: Hezbollah has deep integration with IRGC command structures, while the Houthis operate with significant autonomy and Hamas maintains an independent chain of command.

Iran’s proxy strategy is not unique — it is a regional norm. Saudi Arabia and the UAE prosecuted a devastating war in Yemen. Turkey arms factions in Syria and Libya. The United States provides $3.8 billion annually in military aid to Israel, arms sales worth tens of billions to Saudi Arabia, and has maintained its own network of partner forces across the region for decades. Every major state in the Middle East funds armed non-state actors or conducts operations through proxies. The phrase “supports terrorism” applies selectively — it names an activity that the accusing state also practices, under different labels.

The claim is deployed to foreclose the question of why. Iran’s proxy strategy is, by most serious strategic analysis, an asymmetric deterrence posture. Iran’s conventional military budget is a fraction of its adversaries’. It cannot compete in fighter jets, aircraft carriers, or precision-guided munitions. The proxy network is a force multiplier — a way to project influence and create strategic depth against states that outspend it many times over. This is not a moral defense of the strategy; it is a factual description of its logic. The framing of “supports terrorism” renders this strategic calculus invisible and replaces it with the implication of irrational evil.

Every major state in the Middle East funds armed non-state actors or conducts operations through proxies. The phrase “supports terrorism” applies selectively — it names an activity that the accusing state also practices, under different labels.


“Iran Spends on Missiles Instead of Its People”

At the March 19, 2026 Pentagon press briefing, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth accused Iran of investing in missiles and weapons rather than caring for the Iranian people. He made this accusation during the same briefing in which he requested $200 billion in additional U.S. war funding — on top of the Pentagon’s existing $800+ billion annual budget and a proposed $1.5 trillion defense budget for FY2027.

The Per Capita Reality

Military Spending Per Capita (USD)
Israel
$5,000
United States
$2,900
Saudi Arabia
~$2,000
Iran
$90

Iran spends approximately $90 per person on its military. The United States spends $2,900 — over 32 times more. Israel spends $5,000 — more than 55 times Iran’s figure. The country accused of overspending on its military has the smallest per capita military budget of any major actor in the conflict.

Iran’s Actual Budget Breakdown

Since the 1979 revolution, Iran’s government spending has averaged 59% on social policies (including education, health, and social security), 17% on economic matters, 15% on national defense, and 13% on general affairs. Iran’s education spending as a share of government expenditure was 18.82% in 2022 — well above the global average of 13.94%. Iran’s official defense spending as a percentage of GDP hovers around 2.1%, comparable to the United Kingdom and France.

The Complication: Off-Budget Military Spending

Iran’s official figures understate its true military economy. The Iran Open Data Center estimates the actual 2025 military budget exceeds $23 billion when oil quotas and special project credits are included — over double SIPRI’s figure. The 2025 Iranian budget allocated 51% of oil and gas export revenues to the IRGC and Law Enforcement Command. And the IRGC controls an estimated $30–50 billion in annual economic turnover through its sprawling business empire. Iran’s military economy is more opaque and pervasive than official budget lines suggest.

But even the highest estimates of Iran’s total military-adjacent economy ($30–50B in IRGC turnover) are dwarfed by the U.S. defense budget ($886B in FY2024) — before the proposed $200 billion supplemental and $1.5 trillion FY2027 request.

The Hypocrisy in Three Numbers

$200B
Pentagon supplemental request for Iran war
$1.5T
Proposed FY2027 DoD budget
$1B/day
Current U.S. war spending rate

The $200 billion Hegseth requested is more than the annual defense spending of every country on Earth except the United States. It is additive to a record-setting $1.5 trillion defense budget proposal. The U.S. is spending more per day on Operation Epic Fury ($1–2 billion) than Iran’s entire estimated annual proxy network budget.

The man accusing Iran of choosing weapons over people is, in the same breath, asking Congress to fund the most expensive military operation since Iraq — for a war Congress never authorized, with no stated timeline for ending.

The Sanctions Causation Problem

Much of the civilian suffering in Iran — medicine shortages, inflation, infrastructure decay, water scarcity — is directly attributable to decades of U.S. sanctions. The maximum pressure campaigns have explicitly targeted Iran’s ability to sell oil, access the international banking system, and import critical goods. The United States is simultaneously causing the civilian suffering and then citing it as evidence of Iranian government malfeasance.

This is not an incidental irony. It is the architecture of the argument. Sanctions degrade domestic conditions. Degraded conditions become evidence that the regime doesn’t care about its people. That evidence becomes justification for the military operations that produce more suffering. The loop closes.

The man accusing Iran of choosing weapons over people is, in the same breath, asking Congress to fund the most expensive military operation since Iraq — for a war Congress never authorized, with no stated timeline for ending.


Who Spends What

Country Military Budget Per Capita % of GDP Proxy/Aid Spending
United States $886B (FY2024) $2,900 ~3.4% $3.8B/yr to Israel alone; billions more in regional arms sales
Israel $27.5B $5,000 ~5.3% Recipient of largest U.S. aid package
Saudi Arabia $75B ~$2,000 ~6% Funded factions in Yemen, Syria; billions in arms imports
Iran (official) $7.9B (SIPRI 2024) $90 ~2.1% $1–2B/yr proxy network
Iran (est. actual) $17–23B ~$200–260 ~4–5% $6–12B including IRGC off-budget

Even using the highest available estimates for Iran’s total military and proxy spending, the country spends a fraction of what its adversaries do. The disparity is not marginal — it is orders of magnitude. The narrative that Iran is uniquely militaristic does not survive contact with comparative data.


Rhetoric as Infrastructure

Both claims — “supports terrorism” and “spends on weapons instead of people” — function as war-legitimizing rhetoric rather than analytical statements. They are designed to construct Iran as an irrational, uniquely malevolent actor whose destruction is self-evidently justified. They work not by presenting evidence but by suppressing context.

“Supports terrorism” works by applying a label selectively — naming an activity that all regional powers engage in, but only stigmatizing one. “Spends on weapons instead of people” works by inverting causation — blaming Iran for suffering that U.S. policy deliberately inflicted, while simultaneously requesting more money for weapons than Iran’s entire GDP.

These phrases are not descriptions of reality. They are load-bearing walls in the architecture of a war. They are the discursive infrastructure that makes a $200 billion bombing campaign feel like common sense.

Understanding them as rhetoric — as constructed, interested, and falsifiable — is the first step toward seeing the war clearly.

These phrases are not descriptions of reality. They are load-bearing walls in the architecture of a war.

Sources & Data

Military spending data: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database (sipri.org/databases); World Bank indicators; Iran Open Data Center (iranopendata.org); Trading Economics

Iran proxy spending estimates: U.S. State Department; Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD); Daktilo 1984; This is Beirut; Iran War Updates

Iran budget composition: Economy of Iran, Wikipedia (citing World Bank, IMF, Statistical Centre of Iran); UNESCO Institute for Statistics; The Global Economy

Hegseth/Pentagon statements: CNBC, March 19, 2026; Al Jazeera, March 19, 2026; The Intercept, March 19, 2026; PBS NewsHour, March 19, 2026; Axios, March 19, 2026; CNN, March 20, 2026; Breaking Defense, March 19, 2026; Military.com, March 19, 2026

Per capita comparison: Pravda USA, citing military spending data, March 21, 2026

Operation Epic Fury context: NPR, March 2, 2026; Haaretz, March 2, 2026; WhiteHouse.gov, March 2026