MSHA-520 · Humanitarian negotiation case study analysis
Ethiopia civil war: stakeholder network & Island of Agreements
Federal coalition
TPLF coalition
Humanitarian actors
Mediators
Armed opposition
Island of Agreements — norm dynamics from transcript
Convergent norms
• People in need should receive humanitarian assistance
• Host government has the right to know what is being brought in
• Accountability to affected populations is a shared obligation
• Humanitarian principles (neutrality, impartiality, independence) are understood
Contested norms (convergent in principle → divergent in practice)
• Accountability: government invoked this norm to justify extreme bureaucratic restrictions (health kit inspections, “dual-use” medicine claims) that functionally blocked access
• Humanitarian access: government acknowledged need for aid but imposed conditions (manifests, cash limits, travel approvals) amounting to a de facto blockade
• Fuel access: denied fuel entry into Tigray; eventually allowed 2M liters after extended negotiation
Divergent norms / red lines
• Government framed all aid as potential support for the enemy (aid diversion suspicion)
• Expulsion of 7 senior UN staff (including OCHA head) when perceived push-back was too strong
• Government cut electricity, water, internet, commercial activity — collective punishment vs. security framing
Federal coalition
TPLF coalition
Humanitarian actors
Mediators
Armed opposition
Key events
The Island of Agreements framework maps where norms are shared, where they’re contested, and where they break down — identifying the negotiable space.
| Actor | Primary interest | Position on aid | Leverage held | Key negotiation friction |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Federal gov. | Defeat TPLF, maintain sovereignty, restore authority over Tigray | Aid allowed but tightly controlled; feared diversion to enemy | Controls all access routes, airspace, communications, services | Accountability weaponized as bureaucratic obstruction; expelled UN staff |
| Amhara forces | Reclaim Western Tigray territory | Secondary concern; focused on territorial control | Control of Western Tigray displacing populations | Mass displacement created bulk of IDP needs |
| Eritrean forces | Settle old scores with TPLF | Not a primary interlocutor for humanitarians | Military force; loose chain of command → exactions | Violence against civilians; limited accountability |
| TPLF / TDF | Survival of Tigray region & population; legitimacy | Aid is a critical lifeline — wanted control over distribution | Controls access within Tigray; airport shutdown power | Airport fees; advocacy/denunciation conflation; aid distribution control |
| OLA / OLF | Oromo self-determination; grievances against central gov. | Not a primary humanitarian interlocutor | Military disruption in central Ethiopia | Conflict spillover creating additional displacement |
| Humanitarian orgs | Deliver aid based on need; uphold principles | Needs-based, impartial distribution; no substitution for state | International visibility; donor funding; essential services | Navigating restrictions from both sides while maintaining neutrality |
| AU / Kenya / Turkey | Regional stability; mediation credibility | Supportive of humanitarian access as part of peace process | Diplomatic relationships with both parties | Brokered the Nov 2022 Cessation of Hostilities Agreement |
This matrix maps each actor’s interests against their stance on humanitarian aid, their leverage, and the key points of friction in negotiations.
Source: Presentation 4.2 Spotlight Interview with Bruno Husquinet — Case Study of Humanitarian Negotiation in Ethiopia. USD Kroc School, MSHA-520. · Analysis produced March 2026.